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CUSTOMIZING CONCEPTION: A SURVEY OF 
PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS AND THE 
RESULTING SOCIAL, ETHICAL, AND LEGAL DILEMMAS 
One in six American couples experience difficulties conceiving a child.  
With fertility rates at an all time low, the business of treating infertility is 
booming.  However, due to the United States prohibition on government 
funding for embryonic research, the $4 billion industry of assisted 
reproductive technologies (ART) has been incompletely monitored and 
largely removed from oversight.  Additionally, due to the fervent 
abortion debate, in vitro fertilization (IVF) was introduced in the United 
States without a research phase and procedures have been forced to 
evolve in the private sector.  Thus, the checks and balances on medical 
innovation that are generally imposed by the federal government for 
consumer protection are lacking.  Decisions about when to go from the 
laboratory to the clinic are often left solely to the discretion of private 
physicians.  Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is just one of 
many such treatments offered by these clinics.  This iBrief examines how, 
why, and to whom the reproductive procedure of PGD is offered.  In 
addition, it evaluates the prospective effects to society that arise when 
PGD is used for sex selection and for nontherapeutic or enhancement 
purposes.  Finally, it explores whether and how to regulate PGD in the 
United States by investigating approaches to policy making that have 
been adopted by the United Kingdom.   
 
The great challenge to mankind today is not only how to create, but to know when to stop 
creating. 
—Lord Emmanuel Jacobvitz, former chief rabbi of Britain. 
 
Attending to her father and witnessing two siblings progressively deteriorate from the 
agonizing dementia that is characteristic of Alzheimer’s disease recently led a Chicago woman in 
her early thirties to vow this dreadful fate would not be passed along to her child.  The patient—
who will almost certainly develop the disease by age forty—stood a 50% chance of having a child 
who would inherit the genetic anomaly.  This led her to a specialist at Chicago’s Reproductive 
Genetics Institute, where she was introduced to the possibility of preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis.  Using in vitro fertilization techniques, doctors trained in reproductive medicine were 
able to fertilize thirteen of her eggs in petri dishes with the father’s sperm.  PGD then allowed 
them to screen these embryos for the six that were free from the defect.  They implanted four of 
the six, which resulted in the birth of a healthy baby girl free from the fate bestowed on her 
 
grandfather and her mother’s siblings.  Although PGD has been used to screen for genetic 
abnormalities for over a decade, this was the first known PGD procedure used to detect inherited 
early-onset Alzheimer’s disease, which resulted in a clinical pregnancy and the birth of a child 
free from the disposition. 
Human genomic research has led to innovations in reproductive technologies that are 
altering our attitudes towards procreation, and publicized success of cases like this will ultimately 
increase the demand for access to PGD.  Although most agree that screening for Alzheimer’s 
disease is auspicious in itself, PGD does have the potential to open the floodgates to selecting for 
a wider array of traits or essentially “customizing conception.”  Presently, it is not practicable to 
use PGD as a means of selecting physical characteristics, behavioral traits, or intelligence.  
However, the genetic components of these expressions are being investigated, and it is only a 
matter of time before technology will allow parents to select traits for their children that are most 
desirable to them.  The potential for impacting future generations makes this a revolution that 
could be in danger of becoming a more politically sensitive matter than abortion. 
Procreative autonomy or reproductive choice is often the principal argument advanced to 
discourage governmental oversight.  Others believe that regulation would stifle debate and 
discourage a moral consensus, or that legislation encompassing these new technologies may not 
be desirable where it would “run contrary to basic human rights and freedoms.”  However, the 
laissez-faire approach currently practiced in the United States—while allowing for individual 
agendas of reproductive choice based on religion, culture, philosophy, and wealth—leaves open 
the door to eugenic practices, and could ultimately exacerbate the rift between the affluent and the 
underprivileged. 
Section I.  Who is likely to benefit from PGD? 
Catastrophic reproductive history, genetic risk and aversions to abortions are the primary 
reasons specified for undertaking PGD.1  Reproductive histories of patients surveyed showed that 
the majority of patients have had one or more pregnancies, yet very few of those couples have 
any healthy children.2  Approximately 25% of those couples have had at least one child affected 
with a serious genetic disorder, and a greater number reported spontaneous abortions or 
terminations of pregnancies after an abnormality was detected through prenatal diagnosis.3 
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2 Id. at 246. 
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Before the advent of PGD, testing was performed prenatally in the first trimester by using 
chorionic villus sampling (a biopsy on a small sample of the placenta), ultrasound (using sound 
waves to look at internal structures), or by amniocentesis (the withdrawal of amniotic fluid from 
around the fetus) during the second trimester.  Currently, there are more than 500 different 
conditions that can be diagnosed prenatally, and this number continues to grow significantly each 
year.4  These prenatal approaches, however, leave the couple faced with a decision of whether to 
undergo a “genetic abortion” as late as twenty-four weeks into the pregnancy.  Genetic or 
therapeutic abortions often place the mother at risk and are frequently accompanied by a 
tremendous amount of guilt or grief arising out of the couple’s own genetic status. 
Predictive medicine, such as PGD, while attempting to prevent the passing along of 
genetic susceptibilities, can also eliminate the need to abort a fetus.  IVF provides access to the 
egg and embryo, making it possible to examine the DNA of individual embryos.  Infertile couples 
using IVF, couples at risk for a genetic disease, or those who are aware that one parent is a carrier 
can take advantage of the opportunity to screen their embryos for chromosomal abnormalities 
prior to implantation.  Electing to terminate an embryo after PGD shows an abnormality is often 
an easier decision than abortion, and is less risky to the woman’s health. 
Provided the parents are not hindered by their view of the moral status of the embryo, 
PGD can obviate the 25% to 50% risk of passing on specific genetic abnormalities by offering 
couples the opportunity to terminate in vitro derived embryos that manifest genetic abnormalities 
prior to implantation.  Moreover, PGD restores confidence when the embryo is healthy, and 
offers diagnosis and alternatives when a severe abnormality is present.  It is, therefore, natural to 
see why many have elected to use this technology to avoid the possibility of abortion after 
traditional prenatal diagnosis shows that the fetus has the genetic defect.  If use of PGD becomes 
widespread it has the potential to reduce the occurrence of many of these genetic diseases 
worldwide.  Due to the fact that treatments can easily cost many millions of dollars over the 
lifetime of a single individual, there appears to be a substantial and justifiable interest in 
preventing the occurrences of these traits by employing PGD for therapeutic screening of 
embryos. 
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Section II.  Arguments against using PGD to select for serious diseases 
Moral status of the embryo 
There are relatively few arguments against using PGD to screen for serious diseases.  The 
most often cited seems to be related to the moral status of the embryo.  The argument centers on 
the effect that screening and subsequent termination of embryos has on prenatal life.  Pro-life 
activists argue that life begins at fertilization, not conception.  Thus, the embryos would be 
entitled to the same legal protections that are afforded to individuals.  Therefore, they believe that 
the embryos should not be deprived of any likelihood of implantation, and that they should not be 
subjected to screening that would lessen their chance of survival.5  However, the majority of 
practitioners view this simply as the lesser of two evils.  By allowing for screening prior to 
implantation, PGD has the potential to reduce the amount of abortions that carry greater medical 
and emotional consequences.  Additionally, it is argued that because embryonic cells are 
nondifferentiated–often undergoing spontaneous twinning–the embryo is not clearly individual.6  
Thus, it is contended no life actually taken by the termination of these preembryos. 
The United Kingdom’s licensing and regulatory body for assisted reproductive 
technologies, the Human Fertilization and Embryological Authority (HFEA), has taken the 
position that “a collection of four or sixteen cells is so different from a full human being … that it 
might quite legitimately be treated differently.”7  Consequently, they determined that the time to 
be adopted for regulation of research on embryos is at the appearance of the “primitive streak” at 
about day 14 or 15.8  This “primitive streak” is the visible site of invagination formed by the 
interpositioning of the mesoderm with the endoderm and the ectoderm.9  This view has been held 
to be consistent with the theological view of continuous creation as opposed to the infusion of a 
human soul at a particular moment. 
Late-onset diseases 
While many genetic diseases are progressive and disabling, a late-onset disease allows 
many years of good health.  However, variations in penetrance can frequently generate stress and 
a feeling of uncertainty.  The costs of rearing a child with a late-onset disease may be financially 
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and emotionally significant.  Thus, the presence of a genetic disposition for a late-onset disease 
may go to the heart of the couple’s decision of whether to reproduce at all.  In a case where PGD 
reveals a predisposition for a late-onset disease such as Alzheimer’s or Huntington’s disease, a 
couple may elect to terminate those embryos that are affected.  Some argue that patients suffering 
from these diseases that will not manifest any symptoms for thirty to forty years should not be 
allowed to terminate the affected embryos because they feel that by that time a cure may have 
been developed.  The HFEA acknowledges that while the age of onset is one factor, the 
seriousness of the disorder and the circumstances of the individual couple and family may be 
equally relevant.  They have suggested that age of onset, “should be one of a number of factors, 
but not an overriding factor, in determining whether PGD should be offered.”10 
Disability discrimination claim 
The disability discrimination claim maintains that prenatal or preimplantation screening 
for disabilities results in discrimination against those with the disability by reducing the numbers 
of people affected.  Moreover, they believe that by terminating the fetus or embryo we are 
sending a message that a life with the disability is not worth living at all.  It is also argued that 
developing remedies is hindered by the ability to select against diseases either by PGD or 
abortion.  Millions of people who are currently affected with these disorders are living happy and 
productive lives.  These individuals argue that identifying people based on their circumstances 
has the tendency of perceiving abnormalities as inconveniences.  In addition, they believe that 
“PGD and embryo selection against these traits will reinforce beliefs that they are inferior.”11  
However, one commentator cautions, “it would be a drastic step in favor of equality to inflict a 
higher risk of having a child with a disability on a couple (who do not want a child with a 
disability) to promote social equality….  To attempt to prevent accidents which cause paraplegia 
is not to say that paraplegics are less deserving of respect.”12  It is important to distinguish 
between disability and persons with disabilities.  Selection reduces the prevalence of the former, 
but is silent with respect to the value of the latter.  Consequently, we must evaluate our social 
institutions and beliefs regarding the disabled, but we should not restrict the use of PGD to screen 
for severe genetic disorders solely on the basis of disability rights. 
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Section III.  Sex selection of embryos 
Historically, cultures have practiced sex selection using a variety of means from timing of 
coitus to infanticide.  Infanticide (a form of genetic selection where infants are often suffocated 
soon after birth) has often been practiced in countries such as India and China where families 
place a premium on producing a baby boy.  Continued lineage and economic survival of the 
family are the two principal reasons advanced for undertaking this practice.  And although 
selective female infanticide has been outlawed in India since 1996, the procedure is still 
widespread.13   
However, as prenatal screening technologies such as ultrasound, genetic diagnosis by 
amniocentesis, and chorionic villus sampling have become more readily available, the practice of 
infanticide has declined and many couples are choosing selective abortion as the preferred 
method of ensuring the sex of their children.14  In fact, technicians in China, Taiwan, Bangladesh 
and India travel from village to village with portable ultrasound devices to screen pregnant 
women who pay them to discover the sex of their fetuses.15  As a result, one study conducted in 
India reported that out of 8000 abortions performed, 7999 of the fetuses were females.16  Recent 
developments such as prefertilization separation of X-bearing spermatozoa and PGD followed by 
sex selection have the potential to eliminate theses conventional practices of “gynecide.” 
Prefertilization sex selection techniques, although currently available to humans, are still 
experimental and unreliable.  PGD, on the other hand, has opened the doors to sex selection by 
providing couples with the opportunity to screen embryos for the preferred sex before a 
pregnancy is initiated.  If a single piece of DNA on the Y chromosome is identified then the sex 
of the embryos obtained can be determined with 85-95% accuracy.17  Nevertheless this still 
provokes ethical concerns relating to the perpetuation of gender oppression, the appropriateness 
of expanding control over nonessential characteristics of children, and unfair expenditure of 
limited medical resources.18 
In May 2001, the Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine 
(ASRM)–a group that sets fertility clinic standards nationwide–said it could be ethical for parents 
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to choose their children’s sex for non-medical reasons.19  They stated that they did not feel that it 
would be unethical for parents to utilize this technology to select for a child “of the gender 
opposite that of an existing child or children.”20 Likewise, they acknowledged, “it would not be 
unethical for parents to prefer that their first-born or only child be of a particular gender because 
of the different meaning and companionship experiences that they expect to have.”21  
Although the committee was referring to pre-conception sperm sorting techniques, this 
statement opened the floodgates for the use of PGD for sex selection.  The attitudes of some 
clinicians were that if it is ethically sound to select for sex using a technique that can merely 
improve the odds of gender selection, then logically it follows that it must also be acceptable to 
do so using PGD, which is nearly 100% effective in determining the sex of an embryo.  As a 
result, CHR–one of the largest providers of fertility treatments in the United States–announced 
plans to begin offering sex selection for nonmedical referrals to patients at their New York and 
Chicago clinics.22  However, other commentators did not see this as a logical extension of the 
endorsement on sex selection.  Jeffery Kahn, who is the Director of the Center for Bioethics at the 
University of Minnesota argues, “[s]orting sperm is one thing—it’s quite another to create and 
test embryos before they are implanted in a woman’s womb and discard those of the “wrong” 
gender, at least for many professionals and members of the public.”23 
Accordingly, after an uproar from members of the public and the press, the Chairman of 
the Ethics Committee John A. Robertson announced an updated opinion in a letter dated 
September 17, 2001.24  In summary, the position of the committee was that clinics could ethically 
offer PGD solely for sex selection if there is “good reason to think that the couple is fully 
informed of the risks of the procedure, and are counseled about having unrealistic expectations 
about the behavior of children of the preferred gender.”25  Shortly after, however, in a letter dated 
February 7, 2002, the opinion was again revised to read “the Committee reaffirms its previous 
conclusion that initiating IVF and PGD solely for non-medical gender selection, e.g., for the first 
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child, should be discouraged.  It also concludes that initiating IVF and PGD solely to create 
gender variety in a family should at this time also be discouraged.”26 
Although there is currently little reporting on the use of PGD for sex selection in the 
United States, of the twenty-one centers that submitted data to the European Society of Human 
Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) Consortium, fifteen reported that they were against 
social sexing and only four replied that they were in favor of the procedure.27  The arguments for 
social sexing other than the prevention of sex linked genetic disease include:  the right to self-
regulation of countries, individual rights of procreative choice, and that the elimination of 
embryos of the unwanted sex is a preferred alternative to abortion.28  Couples in favor of sex 
selection maintain that the choice of offspring gender is significant in their decision of whether or 
not to reproduce.  If this argument were accepted then their decision would presumptively be 
protected as a fundamental right and could not be restricted without the showing of a compelling 
state interest.  This aspect of procreative autonomy is the focus of section V. 
With respect to the argument that the termination of embryos of the unwanted sex is a 
lesser evil than selective abortion, Jeffery Kahn responds, “[i]n the case of using in vitro 
fertilization for sex selection, couples test embryos and discard those of the unwanted gender–a 
process that seems to discount or even ignore the seriousness of the ethical issues it raises.”29  
Therefore, if the embryo is to be given any moral status whatsoever, terminating healthy embryos 
because they are of the wrong sex seems to be as immoral as it is unethical. 
Other more attenuated arguments in favor of PGD for sex selection include:  that 
allowing families to select embryos of the desired sex contributes to population control (these 
couples will no longer be compelled to reproduce until they conceive a child of the ideal gender), 
gender balancing within the family (they have one or more children of one sex and would like to 
parent the other sex), and a desire for parental companionship by raising a child of the same 
gender.30  The Ethics Committee of the ASRM believes that although population control is a key 
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issue in many countries, the limited use of PGD and sex selection in the United States cannot be 
currently justified solely on the basis of population limitation.31 
Inherent gender discrimination is the primary reason advanced for prohibiting sex 
selection of embryos.  However, this argument seems to be more compelling when applied in 
countries where gender is tied to economic independence and equal rights.  Presently, there is no 
data that suggests that gender discrimination practiced in the Middle East and Asia would occur if 
we allowed for sex selection in the United States.  Further arguments against using PGD for sex 
selection other than the potential for inherent gender discrimination include:  the use of medical 
resources for sex selection may result in an unfair allocation of medical resources, that 
inappropriate control over trivial characteristics may lead to commodification of children, and 
that widespread use of sex selection may lead to an imbalance of the overall sex ratio within 
society.32 
The decentralized health care system in the United States makes it unlikely that couples 
choosing to take advantage of PGD for sex selection will, as a result, deprive others of limited 
medical resources.  However, if argued in the aggregate, these individual decisions could 
ultimately have some impact on the overall allocation of medical resources.  The argument 
against commodification of children seems to present the strongest case against using PGD for 
sex selection.  As the possible list of genetic tests grow, there will be a greater temptation to 
select for physical traits and behavioral characteristics.  Furthermore, as more and more clinics 
begin to offer PGD the relative demand for standard screening will diminish, and there is some 
concern that existing clinics will begin to offer these supplementary services to remain 
competitive in the marketplace. 
While many commentators argue that PGD for social sexing will produce an unbalanced 
sex ratio, Dr. Malpani at the Malpani Infertility Clinic in Mumbai, India, dismisses these claims 
by stating that the “expense, limited availability and comparative inefficiency of sexing by 
embryo biopsy” make it unlikely to significantly impact the gender ratios of any populations.33  
Moreover, he recommends that in countries like India where cultural preferences for males are 
great, that safeguards should be implemented to restrict PGD for sex selection to only couples 
that already have a child.34  However, even before PGD became available–when the one-child 
policy was being enforced in India–the sex ratio was altered to 153 males for each 100 females.35 
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In the US, sex selection is generally sought for a third or later child of the opposite sex 
than those already produced by the couple.36  One survey reported that 34% of geneticists stated 
that they would perform sex selection for families seeking to have a son, and another 28% said 
that they would refer the couple to a doctor who would.37  Dr. John Stephens’s clinics in 
California, Washington, and New York, already offer couples the opportunity to undergo prenatal 
testing for sex selection.38  Twenty-five percent of American couples surveyed have said that they 
would utilize these sex selection techniques.39  And although Western societies attitudes towards 
women differ significantly from other parts of the world, the demand for male offspring is still 
apparent with 81% of men and 94% of women stating that they would desire to ensure their first 
child was a boy.40  This survey tends to legitimize fears of a potential gender imbalance that the 
ASRM’s Ethics Committee is dismissing as a “remote consequence … remaining too speculative 
to place seriously in the balance of ethical assessments of the techniques.”41 
Section IV.  PGD used to select for nonmedical traits 
Today, we may only be selecting for gender, but as the technology catches up with our 
suspicions we may soon be faced with hundreds of alternatives that could fall under the rubric of 
family balancing.  For example, suppose that thirteen embryos have been biopsied, six are found 
to be free of the specific disorder in question and the doctor is only willing to transfer four of 
them (due to the health risks with multiple pregnancies).  What are the criteria by which the 
remaining two are terminated?  Should we allow sex selection at this point, or what about 
selecting for physical or behavioral preferences?  “There’s a big difference between curing 
infertility, on the one hand, and trying to make sure that your child inherits your curly hair on the 
other,” says Princeton bioethicist and author Lee Silver.42 
So then, on what basis should we ascribe impairment?  Most commentators agree that 
pre-natal and pre-implantation diagnosis should only be used to screen for serious disorders.43  
The “best interests of the child principle” is fundamental to legislation of assisted reproductive 
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technologies in Australia and the United Kingdom.44  This principle provides that the welfare and 
interests of the child are paramount.  Parents are prohibited from requesting inappropriate 
nontherapeutic treatments if they are contrary to the best interests of the child.  On the other hand, 
if two alternatives are considered to be equally viable, the parental choice will be upheld.  This 
approach offers protection for children who cannot help themselves versus offering protection to 
those who may bear the burden of caring for them. 
The English Abortion Act of 1967 provides for a lawful termination of the pregnancy if  
“two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith ... that there is a 
substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical symptoms or mental 
abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.”45  What then should be considered to be severe?  
Can some conditions be severe in some geographical locations and not in others based on climate 
and treatments offered?  Should parents abort a fetus that has a treatable disorder because of 
expense?  Severity is not always determined in the medical sense and can be accessed differently 
among diverse family structures.46  Professor Silver suggests three factors to determine severity: 
impact on quality of child’s health (survival suffering and limitations on function), age of onset, 
and probability that genotype will influence phenotype.47 
Even if these standards are applied through legislation, there remains a threat that more 
and more conditions will be classified as severe as a result of pressure to get access to PGD.48  
Perhaps the use of PGD could be limited by allowing couples to select only against traits that 
would impair one’s “well-being.”  However, selecting against traits that have the potential to limit 
an individual’s well-being naturally suggests that we must select only positive traits.  A positive 
trait may encompass both disease and nondisease genes; thus, the line is again blurred. 
When one screens multiple embryos, however, there is an inherent pressure to select only 
the most desirable traits.  Consequently, PGD has a far greater eugenic potential than prenatal 
genetic testing.  Essentially what would be screened for is a gene that predisposes some physical 
or psychological state such as intelligence, height, or even musical talent.49  Although selecting 
for physical and behavioral traits is not currently possible, the demand seems to exist as 
evidenced by donor catalogs for artificial insemination that allow couples to select for these traits 
by providing information on “ethnicity, hair color and texture, eye color, height, weight, blood 
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type, skin tone, years of education, and occupation (or major in college).”50  The central logic 
behind reform eugenics of the 1930s was that “the human race was faced with genetic 
deterioration unless we actually intervened in reproductive decisions.”51  Ideas about biological 
variations have been the foundation of many of the global atrocities in the past; therefore, we 
should be particularly cautious of distinguishing potential humans on the basis of behavior, 
personality or genetic predispositions to genetic disease. 
Researchers involved in behavioral genetics are seeking to link genes to complex patterns 
of behavior such as alcoholism, bipolar disorders, intelligence, and homosexuality.52  Behavioral 
genetic research can be categorized as the study of “behavioral illness” (depression, 
schizophrenia, Alzheimer's, and attention-deficit disorder), “deviant characteristics” (alcoholism, 
criminal behaviors, and homosexuality), cognitive characteristics (reading disabilities and 
intelligence), or “basic personality dispositions” (shyness, self-esteem, and social attitudes).53  
However, the problem with analyzing this data is that most of these traits are apparently 
polygenic and also significantly influenced by nongenetic environmental factors.  Therefore, 
predisposition testing has a great potential for abuse because it cannot accurately predict whether 
or when these behavioral characteristics will actually express themselves. 
The fear of misinterpreting or misapplying these correlations is that society may view 
non-genetically influenced behavior as the product of “free will,” whereas non-genetically 
influenced behavior will likely be held beyond the control of the individual.54  In fact, criminal 
defense attorneys seized upon one such study published in 1993, which attempted to link the 
MAOA gene with abnormal aggressive behavior, as a way by which to exculpate their clients that 
were serving death row sentences.55 
The principle of procreative autonomy claims that couples should be free to determine 
when and how to have children, and many see selection of nonmedical traits as a logical 
extension of this principle.  They further support this argument by stating that if people are free to 
choose whether to procreate, and if these behavioral characteristics are central to that decision, 
then couples should be able to select for nonmedical traits as well.  Proponents of selecting for 
nondisease genes often equate their argument to selecting for disease genes by stating “it is not 
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disease which is important but its impact on well-being.”56  This implies that if intelligence 
affects one’s well-being then parents should select for it without regard to social inequality. 
Others suggest that if we allow selection of embryos based on intelligence, physical, and 
psychological traits then we will be contributing to inequality in society.  These critics argue that 
by selecting the best embryos we are circumventing the natural random process of evolution, and 
that selecting for non-disease traits will lead to commodification of children.57  They fear that 
consumer-driven parents may feel as though they paid for a perfect child and that anything less 
than perfect would be unacceptable.  Thus, parents might place excessive expectations on their 
customized children. 
While the current effects on society from the use of PGD are minute, Professor Silver 
feels that in time affluent parents will have children who are less prone to disease.58 Moreover, he 
believes that this effect will combine with the increased chance for success already possessed by 
children raised under better environments, which will eventually lead to an even wider gap 
between the “haves” and the “have nots.”59  In other words, while wealthy parents are able to 
select traits for happiness, creativity and physical talents, disorders such as obesity, heart disease, 
alcoholism and mental illness will be left to “drift randomly among the families of the 
underclass.”60  Bioethicist, George Annas, has stated, 
[t]o try to give your child a genetic head start would, I think, be 
irresistible for parents who could afford to pay for it ….  This could be 
very problematic for society.  It’s a road I don’t think we should go 
down.  But it’s one I could see us going down very quickly as a result of 
advertising, peer pressure, and so on ... and that parents who don’t “take 
advantage” of the new genetics will soon be seen as bad or even 
neglectful parents.”61 
Section V.  Legislation of PGD 
Rights-based Arguments 
Arguments in favor of using PGD are generally founded on principles of procreative 
autonomy.  Therefore, any public attempts to regulate this technology would likely be attacked on 
that basis.  The Supreme Court has examined the principle of procreative autonomy associated 
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with the right to privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  
Although the Court has never overtly acknowledged an affirmative right to procreate using IVF, 
Skinner v. Oklahoma recognized, in dicta, that “marriage and procreation are basic civil rights of 
man” and declared procreation to be “a fundamental right essential to the existence and survival 
of the race.”62  Furthermore, Mr. Justice Brennan stated in Eisenstadt v. Baird, “[i]f the right of 
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child.”63  However, Skinner and its progeny involved only 
coital reproduction, and it is uncertain whether this inferred right that stems from a right of 
privacy would be applied to noncoital reproduction. 
Where certain fundamental rights are involved, the Court held in Roe v. Wade “that 
regulations limiting these rights may be justified only by a compelling state interest.”64  The 
Court specifically noted the burdens of carrying, delivering and raising a child and concluded that 
a mother’s interests in avoiding these burdens were significant enough to outweigh the state’s 
interest of protecting the embryo.65  Therefore, it seems logical that this analysis would extend to 
the decision to use PGD to select for serious medical conditions that may give rise to such 
burdens, and that a standard of strict scrutiny would be applied to ensure that the state is 
“pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”66  However, the 
decision may be more complex because IVF separates the embryo from the womb.  Therefore, if 
the embryo is viewed as a separate and physically discrete unit, it may be held to have rights 
independent of the mother.67  Nevertheless, this standard of strict scrutiny that the court applies 
when a state attempts to regulate requires a showing of a “proximate and inherently dangerous 
degree of harm.”68  If such a compelling state interest does exist, the Court has stated that the 
restrictions that attempt to accomplish these interests must be narrowly tailored so as not to be 
overly inclusive.69 
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Supporters of prebirth selection rest their arguments on the connection between the 
expected characteristics of offspring and the decision of whether or not to reproduce.70  If PGD is 
used to select what is merely a preferable trait as opposed to a trait that vitally affects the decision 
of whether or not to reproduce at all, then it may not be viewed within the ambit of procreative 
autonomy or as a fundamental right.  Thus, the state may regulate to further any rational interest.  
This rational interest seems to exist where policy is based on the “best interests of the child” 
principle.  Using PGD for sex selection or for selecting for nonmedical traits does not deal 
directly with the decision of whether an individual can reproduce, but rather it deals with the 
product of their decision to reproduce.  Because of the Supreme Court’s reluctance to recognize 
new rights, these types of decisions would appear to fall outside the scope of the substantive due 
process doctrines founded upon rights traditionally protected within our society. 
Issues of family law have been traditionally left to the states, and most states allow the 
industry to regulate itself.71  The Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology calls itself a 
“governmental watchdog for assisted reproductive technologies.”72  The society collects and 
validates the outcomes of clinical data and requires accreditation of embryology laboratories.  
Nonetheless, membership in SART is voluntary and many establishments do not subscribe.  The 
American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) also has formed an ethics committee that 
publishes guidelines for its members, but again, membership is voluntary. 
Ten states have enacted legislation that prohibits some forms of embryonic research; 
however, six of those have specifically exempted PGD.73  The remaining four only allow PGD 
when it can be shown that it causes no harm to the embryo and is proved to be beneficial.74  
Moreover, there are no state or federal laws directly assessing the nontherapeutic use of PGD.75  
Federal courts in Illinois, Louisiana, and Utah have considered the constitutionality of 
embryological research prohibitions.76  The Lifchez court held that “the constitutional choices that 
include the right to abort a fetus within the first trimester must also include the right to submit to 
a procedure designed to give information about that fetus which can then lead to a decision to 
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abort.”77  More specifically, in Margaret S. v. Treen, the court found that because fundamental 
rights encompass the entire process surrounding abortion, the prohibition of diagnostic testing 
would violate the fundamental rights of women to make reproductive choices.78  However, none 
of these decisions have ruled specifically on the use of PGD. 
Federal Regulatory Framework 
Many believe that the inescapable expenditures of public monies in the direction of 
science and technology demand the introduction of a regulatory framework.  Generally, medical 
procedures are researched and introduced though the NIH.  Only after efficacy is established will 
procedures find their way into private practices.  However, pro-life activists in the United States 
have historically campaigned to enforce the ban on federal funding to institutions conducting 
research on human embryos or assisted conception.79  Consequently, these procedures are no 
longer carried out in governmentally-funded hospitals or universities.  Thus, a market-driven, 
business oriented approach towards research and treatments for assisted reproduction has 
developed. 
In addition to privatization, attempts at federal regulation have encountered numerous 
hurdles.  Since antiabortion sentiments from the Reagan-Bush era led to the abandonment of the 
Ethics and Advisory Board in 1979, there have been only limited attempts at federal oversight of 
reproductive technologies.  Harvard law professor Elizabeth Bartholet criticizes, “this country is 
the only country in our technological position that hasn’t, as a society, faced up to the various 
social and ethical issues involved in this technology.”80  In 1992, Congress enacted Public Law 
102-493 entitled the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act.81  The act called for 
clinics to report pregnancy rates to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and for the 
establishment of a model program for certifying embryo laboratories.82  The CDC has developed 
a set of quality standards that are targeted at assuring the quality of embryo laboratory 
procedures.  They include laboratory personnel qualifications, record maintenance procedures, 
and criteria for the certification and inspection of embryo laboratories.83  However, the model 
program is voluntary and has yet to be adopted or implemented by any state.  Congress 
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established the Biomedical Ethics Advisory Committee in 1988, and the NIH formed an advisory 
panel in 1994 to make recommendations regarding embryo research.84  However, both of these 
bodies continued to be hindered by the divide on abortion issues. 
The FDA claims authority over human cellular and tissue-based products, which include 
embryos, under the authority of section 361 of the Public Health Service (PHS) Act.85  The PHS 
Act provides authority to enforce regulations necessary to “prevent the introduction, transmission, 
or spread of communicable diseases between the States or from foreign countries into the 
States.”86  However, the FDA’s final rule provides an exception for reproductive tissues 
establishments that perform only “certain limited activities that raise limited communicable 
disease concerns.”87  PGD seems to fall under this exception for establishments that only “recover 
reproductive cells or tissue for immediate transfer into a sexually intimate partner of the cell or 
tissue donor.”88 
With the exception of the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act, these 
agencies have been advisory in nature.  Procedurally, we must consider the establishment of a 
separate and independent regulatory agency to review applications for the development and 
implementation of new applications of PGD.  This agency should apply the principle of placing 
the burden of proof of efficacy and safety–in terms of the effects on the children and to society–to 
those clinics who wish to offer new techniques of PGD technologies.  We must be particularly 
careful when attempting to implement this type of technique based legislation that is targeted at a 
particular technology (i.e. human cloning), because the line is often drawn to be overly 
conservative and may be unconstitutional.  Moreover, broad sweeping legislation is not as 
adaptable to changing science and, thus, deals with innovation by halting it. 
Examining the governing body implemented in the United Kingdom offers some 
guidance in this area.  The United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Social Services established a 
16-member committee of inquiry in July of 1982, whose primary objective was to address the 
problem of relating legislation and morality to the business of assisted reproductive technology.89  
The committee issued the Warnock Report in 1984, which called for legislation and led to the 
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creation of the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFEA) in 1990.  The HFEA is a 
licensing authority that authorizes and regulates clinics that offer assisted reproductive 
procedures.  The Authority conducts annual inspections of clinics, grants licenses for treatment 
services or research, and defines the boundaries beyond which treatment and research must not 
venture.  The HFEA assures public representation by requiring that half of their members come 
from areas of specializations outside of medicine and research.90  These members are recruited 
from outside the medical community via newspaper advertisements.91  Their meetings are closed 
to the public and only skeletal minutes are published without individual comments.92 
The HFEA has set forth training and assessment criteria for laboratories and for 
individuals carrying out the embryo biopsy part of the PGD procedure.  They require each biopsy 
practitioner to be “individually inspected and assessed according to these criteria and their names 
registered centrally with the HFEA.”93  The guidelines specify methods of gaining experience and 
stipulate demonstrations of proficiency in using FISH and PCR techniques.  Moreover, inspectors 
and peer reviewers are recruited to evaluate applications to carry out new PGD tests.94  Clinics 
cannot perform any other tests or treat any individuals for new disorders without approval.95  
Additionally, once practitioners are licensed they are required to submit to annual inspections and 
to report the results of their progress.96 
Section VI.  Building on current regulations 
The United States established the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) on 
October 7, 1974.97  The goal of the RAC is to “consider the current state of knowledge and 
technology regarding recombinant DNA.”98  This includes reviewing human gene transfer trials, 
assessing the risks of potential transfer of genetic material to other organisms, and evaluating 
hypothetical hazards and methods for monitoring and minimizing risks.99  The composition of 
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RAC is very similar to that of the HFEA as approximately one-third of the fifteen members do 
not have scientific backgrounds.100 
The RAC has enacted guidelines to apply to “all NIH-funded projects involving 
recombinant DNA techniques as well as to all non-NIH funded research involving recombinant 
DNA techniques conducted at or sponsored by an institution that receives NIH funds for projects 
involving such techniques.”101  Therefore, a logical place to implement regulatory authority 
seems to exist through expanding the committee’s jurisdiction beyond that of publicly funded 
gene therapy to include the review of procedures developed for reproductive purposes.  In the 
vein of the HFEA, the RAC would be both a rule-making and an adjudicatory authority.  Their 
function would be to perform accreditation of laboratories and licensing of PGD in relation to 
each specific test and condition. 
George Annas of Boston University believes that “a meaningful dialogue on such an 
important topic can’t be left solely to experts; it needs public deliberation.”  A solution that 
provides this much-needed element of public transparency would be to establish an institutional 
review board (IRB) within the RAC.  An IRB could require that every new test to be used and 
every new disorder to be tested for be approved in advance.  The disorders should be defined 
down to the level of each different mutation, and then listed on a license under specific headings.  
The screening procedures should only be approved when there can be a compelling 
demonstration of a definite benefit to society and to the child.  An IRB would place this burden of 
proof on parents to show these tests offer an immediate therapeutic benefit to the child and lack 
the potential to do significant harm to society.  Immediate therapeutic benefits exist where 
preventative treatments or early interventions are available, and where these interventions would 
be more beneficial than they would be harmful.  Accordingly, an IRB could deny access to tests 
that do not offer such benefits.  Thus, IRB approval would, in effect, take the discretion away 
from clinicians–who often have a financial stake in offering new procedures–and place the issue 
up for evaluation by an impartial committee. 
Developments in equipment and know-how will enable procedures such as IVF and PGD 
to be offered to a wider array of individuals.  The potential this technology has to eliminate 
genetic disease and to extend life will have a substantial impact on future generations.  
Policymakers should act with deliberate speed in implementing the necessary substantive and 
procedural strategies that are essential to protect future parents and their children. 
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